Externalities of Hedge Fund Activism on the Suppliers of the Targeted firms. How Does Activism Affect All Parties Involved? by Brunskole, David
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Wharton Research Scholars Wharton Undergraduate Research
2019
Externalities of Hedge Fund Activism on the
Suppliers of the Targeted firms. How Does
Activism Affect All Parties Involved?
David Brunskole
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/176
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Brunskole, David, "Externalities of Hedge Fund Activism on the Suppliers of the Targeted firms. How Does Activism Affect All Parties
Involved?" (2019). Wharton Research Scholars. 176.
https://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/176
Externalities of Hedge Fund Activism on the Suppliers of the Targeted
firms. How Does Activism Affect All Parties Involved?
Abstract
The world of hedge fund activism has been heavily reviewed by academics and journalists. However,
academics have truly only looked at the most immediate consequences of activism by primarily researching
the changes in the company targeted. Although important, this neglects the spillover impacts of activism. How
can individuals definitively say shareholder activists are good or bad without looking at all of the effects of
their presence? To help answer this question, the focus of this paper surrounds the externalities of hedge fund
activism on the suppliers of target companies. The results particularly emphasize certain financial metrics,
calculating their change over time as a result of the presence of an activist. Ultimately, the results show that the
presence of an activist has a significantly negative effect on supplier firms, harming operating income margin
and D&A while increasing restructuring costs.
Keywords
Shareholder Activism, Activism, Hedge Fund
Disciplines
Finance and Financial Management
This thesis or dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/wharton_research_scholars/176
 EXTERNALITIES OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM ON THE SUPPLIERS OF TARGETED 
FIRMS. HOW DOES ACTIVISM AFFECT ALL PARTIES INVOLVED? 
By 
David Brunskole 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An Undergraduate Thesis submitted for the fulfillment for the  
 
WHARTON RESEARCH SCHOLARS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Faculty Advisor: 
 
Dr. Vincent Glode 
 
Associate Professor of Finance 
 
 
 
 
THE WHARTON SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
May, 2019 
 2 
Externalities of Hedge Fund activism on the suppliers of the targeted firms. How does 
Activism affect all parties involved? 
 
Abstract 
 
The world of hedge fund activism has been heavily reviewed by academics and 
journalists. However, academics have truly only looked at the most immediate consequences of 
activism by primarily researching the changes in the company targeted. Although important, this 
neglects the spillover impacts of activism. How can individuals definitively say shareholder 
activists are good or bad without looking at all of the effects of their presence? To help answer 
this question, the focus of this paper surrounds the externalities of hedge fund activism on the 
suppliers of target companies. The results particularly emphasize certain financial metrics, 
calculating their change over time as a result of the presence of an activist. Ultimately, the results 
show that the presence of an activist has a significantly negative effect on supplier firms, 
harming operating income margin and D&A while increasing restructuring costs.  
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1. Introduction 
Criticism of shareholder activists by the masses stems from the thought that hedge funds 
are driven entirely by greed. “Pundits” claim that these investors are myopic in focus, putting 
stress on target companies without contemplating the long term consequences. As a result of 
these claims, academics have scoured data in the hopes of substantiating these complaints. In 
fact, the evidence points towards more positives than negatives when it comes to activism. 
Papers have proven that target companies see positive returns in the capital markets, in addition 
to improvements in operations and research / development capabilities. Researchers also see a 
general benefit in the product market of these targets, indicating that competitors see a benefit 
without properly receiving activist attention. Although most literature points to the positive 
benefits of activism, this remains a relatively burgeoning field. As activists become more 
prevalent in the marketplace, academics become more interested in studying their effects. 
Consequently, this paper hopes to contribute to this field, focusing on the spillover effects of 
these campaigns. Mimicking previous studies in this field, the analysis in this paper observed the 
change in financial metrics for supplier firms in the one, two, and three years before and after 
activism. In addition to these time frames, the research also noted financial changes based on the 
specific level of activist engagement, including the first instance of interaction, passing of the 
five percent ownership threshold, and submission of the 13-D. By utilizing binary variables and 
holding certain variables constant, the conducted research focused on the specific impact that 
activism had on these firms. This paper finds that suppliers are negatively affected by these 
funds, notably in the operating income margin. 
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2. Background 
Shareholder activists have been attempting to create value in corporations since the early 
20th century. Officially, according to the SEC, the catalyst for the present version of activism 
came in 1942 with the introduction of regulation 14a-8, which legally required companies to 
allow shareholders to provide proxy materials for annual meetings. Since then, the landscape for 
activism has changed drastically. Stuart and Starks write that the 1940’s through 1970’s saw the 
preponderance of interventions started by individual activists; the contemporary version of 
activism, where institutional investors challenge management, gained legs in the 1980s, starting 
with the formation of the Council of Institutional Investors, a lobbying group for shareholder 
rights. Since then, many companies have had the opportunity to appreciate the actions of activist 
intervention, and in particular, “target firms tend to decrease their capital expenditures, increase 
their payouts, and increase their incidence of asset divestitures, restructurings, or employee 
layoffs” (Denes et al., 2017). Research has thoroughly shown the positive effects that activists 
deliver to target companies and their competitors in the short and long term.  
3. Literature Review 
 While media and management often struggle with perceptions of hedge fund activism, 
research has shown that activists investing in both equity and debt create substantial value for 
investors. However, this claim does not come without debate. The SEC posits that the presence 
of activism encourages accountability among executives, while the Business Roundtable, a 
collection of US company managers, denounces activists as myopic (Goranova and Ryan, 2014). 
Specifically, around the time of the filing of a 13-D, which indicates a hedge fund’s mission to 
turn from the passive to activist category, investors realize “10.2% average abnormal stock 
returns” and 11.4% over the course of the following year (Klein and Zur, 2009). This indicates 
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that, in the short run, activism does more than anger the board and provoke arguments through 
the news. Most literature agrees that activism events promote short-term abnormal returns in the 
equity market. In addition, other academics have looked at the long term effects of hedge fund 
activism in order to challenge a pervasive idea that plagues the activist space: the activist asks for 
changes in the short term that negatively affect the company in the long term. Additionally, a 
paper titled “Recent Advantages in Research on Hedge Fund Activism: Value Creation and 
Identification” has shown that the initial abnormal returns created by the activists are not 
reversed even five years after the initial play (Brav et al., 2015). 
However, some critics complain that these results aren’t generated by activists, rather the 
alpha is just captured at the right time, and activists do not inherently create value. In particular, 
hedge fund activists legitimately improve the underlying operations of target firms. In their paper 
observing the effects of activism on productivity and asset allocation, Brav, Jiang, and Kim 
claim that takeover candidates generally see appreciation of “production efficiency” in the three 
years post 13-D (2015). They prove that activism events increase the output of long term assets, 
“facilitate the efficient reallocation of corporate assets”, and improve labor productivity. Their 
evidence specifically points to the fact that hedge fund activists are markedly different from their 
passive counterparts – activism requires a certain amount of skill in addition to finding 
underperforming assets in comparison to the market. In fact, even with regular hedge funds, the 
ability to regularly generate alpha for limited partners has been proven to require skill. 
Consequently, “performance persistence” among funds, where top performers over a three year 
period generally achieve a similar performance over the three following years, contribute to a 
system where the best funds receive the most investor capital (Ravi et al., 2010). In the same 
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sense, successful activist funds are more than just good at “stock-picking,” they have to 
demonstrate an ability to positively manipulate operations in order to continue to survive.  
Interestingly, given the typically limited holdings by these activists, one might wonder how 
they are so effective in causing change. Some postulate that shareholder activists often work 
together in order to generate the most change in a corporation. Forester Wong, a professor of 
accounting at USC Marshall, explains that “those who accumulate shares before a 13-D filing are 
more likely to be investors who have a relationship with the lead activist, which is consistent 
with coordination by a pack leader” and that the presence of this consortium is positively 
correlated with the future outcome of the major activist’s requests (2016). In other words, 
shareholder activists require the support of other funds in order to increase the likelihood of 
success in affecting the corporate governance of its target firms, thereby permitting the 
manipulation of operations. Regardless, activists are still effective in their contributions to the 
board, as firms see significant increases in operating metrics. 
 Contributing more to the argument that activism actually creates value, certain decisions 
made for target companies have positive, long term effects outside of what this paper previously 
mentioned. While activists are widely criticized for promoting cost cutting and other measures in 
the short term without regards for the long term impact, these actions can turn out to be 
extremely productive. For instance, Brav et al., in a paper observing corporate innovation write 
that “research and development spending drops significantly in absolute amount during the five-
year window subsequent to hedge fund activism. . . [but] patent quality and quantity actually 
improve” (2018). This leads one to believe that R&D prior to intervention was not as efficient as 
it could be, and suggests further that activists are value added managers.   
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 For the broader market, these investors indirectly benefit competitors of whatever 
company received investment. In other words, hedge fund activism creates value for the overall 
market. Aslan and Kumar prove that “rivals respond to activism not only by reducing prices but 
also by improving their own productivity, cost and capital allocation efficiency, and product 
differentiation” (2016). While the magnitude of the benefit “given” to competitors is not the 
same, the overall market clearly becomes more competitive, which benefits consumers.  
 In addition to investing in equity, activists are able to diversify investing strategies in 
order to generate the most alpha. When it comes to taking advantage of a bankruptcy situation, 
hedge funds often are “investing in debt claims, buying equity stakes, serving on the creditors or 
equity committee, and pursuing a ‘loan-to-own’ strategy” (Wei et al., 2012). While this strategy, 
called junior activism, does not require the 13-D, it is an effective way for activists to generate 
alpha. In fact, “when junior activists intend to influence the outcome of a restructuring, they 
publicly file pleadings with the court at key moments in the case to obtain bargaining leverage” 
(Ellias, 2016). So while activists do not file the same documents, there is still a method required 
to go through this process. Furthermore, Ellias shows that the presence of an activist increases 
the appraisal value of a firm, which contributes to the idea that hedge fund activism creates 
value. While junior activism focuses on the outcome of a Chapter 11 proceeding, hedge fund 
activists are also seen to benefit debt holders in general. According to Sunder et al., debt 
investors “benefit alongside shareholders” when shareholder activists “adopt strategies involving 
curbing managerial entrenchment or improving governance” (2014). This shows that these 
activists, while not always boosting the returns of bondholders, can cause a significant gain in 
returns both in the equity and debt in a company. The implications of this finding are obvious: 
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the presence of shareholder activists can benefit every investor, regardless of his or her position 
in the capital structure. 
 While funds seem to clearly benefit the financial metrics and overall efficiency of targets, 
activists play an integral role in the exits of their investments. In fact, some scholars contend that 
shareholder activists only contribute value when the target company goes through an acquisition. 
Michael Schor and Robin Greenwood explain that “activists are most successful at creating value 
when they are able to effect a change in control” (2009). In addition, they illustrate that the 
significant market returns earned by activists are directly related to these acquisitions. Moreover, 
Boyson et al., write, “We find that failed takeover bids for activism targets display significant 
long-term abnormal returns along with improvements in operating performance and changes in 
financial policy compared with activism that is not accompanied by takeover threats” (2017). 
This supports the claim that the presence, or threat, of M&A is the real cause of value to these 
funds. This does not necessarily disagree with literature previously cited in this paper, but it 
points to a specific reason for why investors exhibit abnormal returns. Explicitly, these papers 
attribute the success of activists to the increased probability of M&A. However, one also might 
conclude that the aforementioned performance improvements make these targets more attractive 
acquisition candidates, which attracts the attention of a strategic buyout. Regardless, promoting 
M&A seems to be a viable method for generating returns to shareholders.  
 Despite the previous revelations, it is important to note that activists themselves bear a 
burden in instituting change, irrespective of the outcome of their campaign. Obviously, 
badgering management and releasing news reports costs money. A study by Nickolay Gantchev, 
a professor at SMU and a University of Pennsylvania Ph.D recipient, found that the ultimate cost 
of an activist campaign culminating in a proxy contest amounts to ~$10.71 million. He goes on 
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to explain that this cost has a significant impact on negotiation tactics used by these funds 
(2012). Given this large expense, it makes sense that firms have to choose wisely when investing 
in targets. Furthermore, this contributes to the idea that firms prefer to work with management. 
Ultimately, this goes to show that firms must be critical in analyzing target companies, as the 
effort is far from inexpensive. 
 Ultimately, the research shows that hedge fund activists are extremely valuable for 
investors and the economy. Manipulating management by investing in equity or debt allows for 
considerable appreciation of a firm’s operations, which ultimately increases value. While some 
argue against the actions of activists by citing short-termism, it is nearly impossible to argue 
against the positive impact markets are actually seeing. More specifically, activists create value 
for firms by increasing efficiency while still cutting costs. Moreover, the cost cutting streamlines 
the organization’s effectiveness, and there is not a long term negative impact as a result of 
spending less. This indicates that activists are actually good managers, and they are genuinely 
trying to create better businesses.  
These previous discoveries have been surface level – a thorough look at the externalities 
must be completed in order to fully understand how activism affects the economy. While returns 
and improvements in target companies are good, if activists negatively affect suppliers, then 
academics and regulators may need to start observing interventions with a different light. As a 
result, observing the implications of activism on third parties appears to be the next logical step 
in this general research arena. This rest of this paper seeks to find the impact on these 
aforementioned third parties.   
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4. Data 
4.1 Data Description 
To help test this hypothesis, Alon Brav and Wei Jiang, prominent scholars who have been 
cited throughout this paper, graciously shared hedge fund activist data from 1994 – 2014. This 
paragraph is to thank them for their generosity. 
The methods for conducting this research drew upon previous studies in this field, 
primarily utilizing the data provided by Brav and Jiang. Generally, it is difficult and time 
consuming to assess the actual beginning of an activist campaign, but the government has an 
established criteria for classifying activism. Given the requirement to submit a 13-D filing, 
searching EDGAR provides a way to find instances of activism. Luckily, the provided dataset 
already searched this database. Furthermore, Brav et al., in the article on corporate innovation, 
discussed “using news searches for activists who own between two percent and five percent of 
shares at mid to large cap companies” in order to get an even more detailed data set (2018). This 
added more data points for this study. Additionally, the contributed dataset provides the 
following information: fund name, target name, CUSIP, date of the 13-D, date of the five percent 
threshold, and date of the first interaction. In all, there are roughly 4,000 instances of activism 
that Brav and Jiang have observed.  
 This data was then inputted into Wharton Research Data Services website in order to 
draw from Factset and Compustat. Factset’s Revere database provided information on the 
suppliers of the targeted firms. This was extremely convenient, as Revere noted all suppliers of 
the target firms within the data set’s time frame. The next step utilized the acquired CUSIPS and 
tickers to gather quarterly information on all of the target firms from both of the previously 
mentioned databases. In particular, Compustat was able to provide the SIC codes that Brav et al. 
use for industry fixed effects. Specifically, Factset and Compustat gave financial information 
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necessary to run the regressions, including: market value, total assets, total liabilities, return on 
assets, operating income, total revenue, cost of goods sold, SG&A, and D&A. In addition to this 
information, company age was used as a control during the regression. Gathering this 
information required manually scrubbing google and company website pages. Age zero was 
defined as the year the company was founded, and this increased by a fourth for each additional 
quarter. 
4.2 Data Cleaning 
While Brav and Jiang provided thorough data in the initial activism set, inputting these 
CUSIPS into Factset Revere came with challenges. Many of the resulting supplier relationships 
lacked sufficient data to proceed with extracting their respective financial information from 
Compustat or Factset. In some instances, these suppliers did not have usable CUSIP or tickers, or 
they lacked the necessary “begin” and “end” date of their relationship with the target. In these 
instances, the firms could not provide us the requisite data to include them in the regressions. 
After accounting for these issues and removing the afflicted suppliers, the dataset then noted the 
targets that were present at the time of activism, and it also included the firms that were not 
engaged with the target during this time. This allowed the research to be more accurate, as the 
regression was then able to account for the change in financial metrics for targets specifically 
with respect to the presence of the activist by using a binary activism variable.  
4.3 Methodology 
 Having procured the necessary financial information and controls, the following 
regression was run: 
 13 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙	𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐,,.= 𝛼, + 𝛼234 + 𝜏. + 𝛽𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑚,,. + 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝑂𝑛𝑒	𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟,,. + 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝑇𝑤𝑜	𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠,,.+ 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒	𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠,,. + 𝜃Χ,,. + 𝜖,,. 
The nature of this analysis relied heavily on the methodology used by Brav et al. in their papers 
on corporate innovation and asset productivity. First, the financial metrics in question were the 
ones mentioned earlier in the Data Description section. This study initially looked at ROA, 
Tobin’s Q, defined as market value over book value of assets and liabilities, and operating 
income margin. Using the regression formula above, we solved for the aforementioned financial 
metrics, whereby the subscript c,t represents each supplier company and time period, 
respectively. As for time, we specifically looked at the quarters changing from t - three to t + 
three years, with t = zero acting as the event where the fund first initiated contact, acquired five 
percent of the company, or submitted a 13-D. Next, the formula controlled for many things in 
order to remain certain that the regression specifically looked at the impact of hedge fund 
activism. In particular, this research utilized the controls included in the papers mentioned above, 
and this is represented by 𝜃Χ,,.. Specifically, firm size and company age were controlled by 
taking the logarithm of market value and adding the firm’s age since founding, respectively. 
Moreover, we added firm fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and time fixed effects. Industry 
fixed effects utilized the SIC codes downloaded from Compustat, and this was accounted for by 
the 𝛼234  in the regression formula. For firm fixed effects, the ticker of each individual company 
was noted. This input is reflected by 𝛼,, and it reflects aspects of each company that are different 
from the others. Finally, time fixed effects had to be adjusted for the differences in financial 
period end dates. To do so, quarter end dates received a count, with the earliest possible quarter 
receiving a one and subsequent quarters adding a one to the previous. As some firms ended their 
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first quarter in the year during January, February, or March, these were rolled up into the same 
period for fixed effects purposes. As an example, March 31, February 28, and January 31 end 
dates would all receive the same count, depending on the year. Furthermore, time fixed effects 
demonstrate changes in the environment that occur over time, such as tax or law changes, and 𝜏. 
represented this control. As briefly mentioned previously, together, these elements are added to 
isolate the effects of the presence of an activist, ensuring that commonalities are left out of the 
analysis. Most importantly, 𝛽𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑚,,. shows how the financial ratios are actually affected by 
activists; this is a binary variable, whereby 𝛽 = one when the activist has made contact with the 
target. We utilize this variable for the first instance of activism, time of crossing the five percent 
threshold, and date of signage of 13-D. This allows the regression to show if there is a difference 
in significance among the levels of “hostility” demonstrated by the activists. The variables in the 
form of 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝑂𝑛𝑒	𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟,,., 	𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝑇𝑤𝑜	𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠,,., and 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒	𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒	𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠,,.	follow the same 
binary method as the original activism variable. Instead of inserting a one after the instance of 
activism, these year variables focus only on the time period around the event. To elaborate, time 
one year looks at the change in the targeted financial metrics one year before and after activism - 
time two and three years follow the same prescription. 
5. Results 
Initially, this paper focused targeted the regression on Tobin’s Q and ROA in order to 
understand how the market values the supplier’s assets post activism and how resilient the 
suppliers are to potential relationship disruption. The tables below show the results for these two 
variables.  
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Interestingly, ROA seemed to have a significant change as result of activism at the point 
of initial contact with the target firm. However, these results were not seen in the subsequent 
years, nor did they apply to the 13-D or five percent threshold. Moreover, the Tobin’s Q value 
had a significant change between the two years pre and post activism. What is more, the activist 
had a more pronounced impact on these suppliers at the point of 13-D versus the initial point of 
contact. While Tobin’s Q is a proxy for the market’s view on a company’s performance and 
ROA demonstrates actual performance with respect to company resources, these results 
demonstrate a minimal impact on the supplier firm. To explain further, the market does not 
change its opinion on these firms, nor is profitability impacted with respect to the assets on the 
balance sheet. However, these results make the regression on operating income more interesting. 
It is important to note that the return on assets does not use exactly the same numerator as the 
operating income margin, though both of these metrics provide valuable insight. Table three on 
the following page shows the regression run on the operating income margin, and the results 
imply even more significance than in the prior tables. Specifically, operating income is 
negatively affected by activists at the two year mark, inclusive of the three different interaction 
mediums mentioned throughout this paper. Contrasting these results with those of the ROA 
regression, it appears as if profitability really does experience a negative shock as a result of 
these activists. More saliently, while ROA illustrates a lack of an impact on the supplier firm, 
activist intervention clearly hampers operating income margin to a p value of less than 0.01.    
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The results of this regression analysis require a deeper glance into the underlying financial 
metrics that are affected by the activist. Limited by the information available on both Factset and 
Compustat, the only available data underlying this margin includes SG&A margin, Other 
Operating Expense Margin, COGS Margin, and Depreciation and Amortization margin. 
Observing the impact on these allowed for a deep dive into the actual cause of the significant 
change in operating income margin. The results of these tables can be found in the appendix 
below. Ultimately, other operating expense margin (Table 3a) and D&A margin (Table 3b) had 
significant effects on operating income margin at the two year and three year marks, 
respectively. The components of Depreciation and Amortization are rather straightforward to 
understand, but those of other operating expenses are multifaceted and generally differ from firm 
to firm. Unfortunately, and as seen above, Factset does not break out the components that make 
up this line item. Labor and Related Expense, Equipment Expense, and interest expense were 
used as proxies for other operating expenses in order to see if these might shed more light on the 
afflicted operating income. Restructuring and reorganization expenses became interesting in the 
event that the negative margin pushed suppliers towards insolvency. While the results pictured 
insignificant changes in labor and interest expenses, equipment and restructuring expenses 
changed significantly. These results can be seen in tables four and five below.  
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At the three year mark, equipment expense experiences a significant increase in cost, and this 
bump is more impactful in the two and three years post activism. Looking at restructuring and 
reorganization expenses, there is a similar trend, with the cost being significant at the five 
percent threshold. 
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6. Discussion 
Ultimately, the results were unexpected. This project initially had zero expectations for the 
spillover effects into the supplier market. Due to the volatile nature of supplier contracts and the 
turnover in relationship tenure, the potential for change in financial metrics encouraged analysis. 
As mentioned before, the operating income margin had a significant negative change between 
the two years pre and post activism. The underlying changes in expenses that affect this metric 
imply that supplier firms become more efficient in operations as they anticipate the target firms’ 
reactions to activism. Moreover, the increase in equipment expense points towards a potential 
administrative response. More saliently, other operating expenses and D&A lead to the biggest 
impact on operating margin. In order to double check this response, these expenses were added 
back to operating income. This isolated the effects of cost of goods sold and other undiscussed 
expenses, allowing the regression to see if operating margin was still implicated. Table six below 
illustrates these results. When adding back, the results do not elucidate a significant impact on 
operating income, which corroborates the claim that other operating expenses and D&A are 
significantly changed in the presence of an activist. Pointing back to the earlier paragraph on the 
change in ROA with respect to operating margin, there is a potential reason for the insignificant 
results on this metric. These suppliers are potentially scaling down their operations as the 
activists move into the picture; given that both D&A and operating margin have negative 
trajectories post activism, these trends might be similar in magnitude, which could explain the 
limited change in ROA.  
These changes lead to further questions about how suppliers react to these events. 
Potentially, suppliers increase their capital expenditures as they struggle to become more 
attractive to targets. As a result, they increase physical infrastructure, which increases the wear 
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and tear costs of D&A. Digging deeper into the operating margin lead to the discovery of SG&A 
changes, located in table seven. As is presented, SG&A costs significantly increase to a p value 
of .01%. Given the pressures imposed onto targets by activists, this effect may be caused by a re-
examination of administrative activities by the supplier. In other words, suppliers may evaluate 
their relationships with targets and attempt to increase the manpower on each account, which 
may cause an additional spend in SG&A. Finally, as seen in table five above, restructuring 
charges increase as a result of activism. This result could be caused by target firms adopting new 
supplier contracts and churning the old. In the event that the suppliers have only a few 
customers, the loss of a target firm would have a severe impact on profitability, and thus, 
solvency. While one could debate the impetus for the changes in the other financial metrics, 
restructuring and reorganization expenses seem more straightforward. This unfortunate 
consequence of activism definitively hurts suppliers. Ultimately, our results point towards 
strictly negative outcomes for the suppliers of targets. While this, obviously, will not happen in 
every case, it underscores the need for caution when an activist first interacts with a target 
company.  
7. Conclusion 
As one can clearly delineate from the literature review, this is an extremely popular topic 
in the academic community. Even more, news outlets constantly speak about the new, different 
raiders that have taken over in the investing community. However, research indicates that 
activists largely contribute in a positive way to the economy, enhancing value creation and the 
long-term potential of target companies. Regardless of these positive assertions, it remains 
important to discover all consequences of activism. After performing this analysis, it has become 
apparent that the presence of an activist has damaging consequences for the suppliers of target 
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firms. The most alarming consequence for suppliers is the impact on profitability. As seen, 
operating income decreases as suppliers scramble to keep up with contract changes. Observing 
the underlying expense ratios specifically exposed the levers that suppliers must pull as they 
struggle to remain profitable. Unfortunately, depreciation and amortization costs increase, and 
so, too, do other operating expenses. The significant impact on restructuring and reorganization 
charges also has a stark impact on suppliers. From a policy perspective, the combination of these 
negative shocks implores politicians to pursue potential legal defenses against activism. While 
the larger academic literature negates strong policy against activism, it is important that 
legislature looks at the larger ramifications. Of course, the capitalist nature of our society 
prevents an extreme “visible” hand intervention. However, policy makers must find some way to 
benefit the suppliers so that the larger economy can also see gains from these interventions. 
Ultimately, if value is created by supplier firms as they recalibrate their business strategy post 
activism, then there is not much policy can or should do. In addition, further research is required 
to delineate all the spillover effects of activism.  
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